Introduction
How much can governments borrow from private markets? This question goes to the heart of the debate regarding the impact of financial globalization on government policy (see Cohen, 1996; Ocapmo and Stiglitz, 2008) . Government debt 'provides a most likely location for the operation of financial market pressures' (Mosley, 2003 p.17; italics in original). Investors reward or punish governments for policy decisions directly through the cost and availability of financing. The more a government can borrow, the greater its immediate ability to carry out its chosen policies. Borrowing capacity has been seen as crucial to the outcome of both World War One (Frieden, 2006 p.131 ) and the Cold War (Ferguson, 2001 p.406) . Even in less confrontational times, government debt is not only a transfer of resources between generations but potentially between successive governments. 'Eventually the debt would have to be repaid. For a politician, however, eventually is a long time, certainly farther in the future than the next election' (Frieden, 2006 p.381 ; also Allen and Gale 1994; Geddes 1994 ).
Despite the temptation for politicians in borrowing, the levels of government debt vary markedly. In the 31 middle income 'emerging market' countries in the 'EMBI Global', an index of emerging market bonds, the ratio of government international debt to GDP in 2006 ranges from Lebanon's 85.7 percent to China's 1.5 percent of GDP (IMF, 2006f p.34) . For domestic debt, the 23 countries in the 'EMLI+' (a local currency debt index) ranges from Singapore's 102.7 percent 1 (IMF, 2006d p.26) to Hong Kong's 1.0 per cent (IMF, 2006e p.23) . While very low levels of debt are the result only of government decisions, at higher levels, it is a question of how much lenders will finance (Frieden 1991; Reinhart et al., 2003) . Private lenders (for governments, overwhelmingly bond market investors) will obviously lend only when they believe the debt will be repaid. Their concern is debt sustainability. Sustainability is, however, difficult to analyse precisely (IMF, 2002) . The interest rate paid is a key component on any calculation, and debt sustainability is therefore most questioned at times of rapidly rising interest rates. For many emerging market countries, the possibility of such 'debt crises' -culminating in markets no longer financing governments -is a constant concern, particularly for 'debt intolerant' countries, with a history of default and high inflation, where crises can occur at relatively low levels of indebtedness (Reinhart et al., 2003) .
The international financial institutions have well-established views on minimizing the risk of such crises: increase demand for government bonds, and maximise the stability of that demand, by attracting investors with the broadest range of opinions (IMF, 2003) . This reduces yields, and, by increasing the likelihood of sellers and buyers meeting, reduces volatility. Government bond markets should therefore be as liquid as possible. Investors should be able to follow the broadest range of investment strategies, including short selling, and be able to reverse those strategies easily. In brief, governments should increase the ability of investors to trade risk.
This article examines these views and resultant policy recommendations. Does increasing the ability of investors to trade in emerging government bond marketsdefined here as increasing financialization -enhance or diminish the ability of governments to borrow? It concludes that the more (less) financialized an emerging government bond market, the lower (higher) the capacity of governments to borrow on a sustainable basis. In emerging markets, financialized markets are debt intolerant markets. The article examines two issues: the varied levels of debt-to-GDP that different emerging market governments have sustained, and the way bond markets have reacted to situations that precipitated, or could have precipitated, a 'debt crisis'.
Financialization
Financialization, it is argued here, undermines sustainable borrowing by increasing the cost of that borrowing (on financial liberalization increasing Turkish interest rates, see Aricanli and Rodrik 1990) and making financial crises more likely and more
severe. This article can therefore be seen as sharing the post-Keynesian view of financial liberalization as resulting in increased volatility (see Grabel 1995; on Brazilian liberalization of capital outflows, de Paula, 2008; Gottschalk and Sodré, 2008) , and an increased likelihood of crisis. By utilizing financialization as the independent variable, however, the article moves beyond considering only liberalization.
Financialization is defined here as the ability to trade risk; both taking and trading the risk on the performance of an asset. Securities markets are designed to allow the buying and selling of various types of risk, but the ability to do so -the liquidity of individual markets (e.g., Carruthers and Stinchcombe 1990) -varies considerably.
Furthermore, the ability of an individual investor to trade risk in a particular market is a function not only of the financialization of the government bond market structure (i.e., the constraints on the trading of risk in the particular market), but also of the financialization of the investor (i.e., his/her own ability to trade risk). Individuals' ability to trade risk, for example, is constrained even in the most liquid market.
Furthermore, as demonstrated below, the financialization of the investors that dominate a particular market will interact with the financialization of the formal market structure to determine the ability of all investors to trade risk in that market.
The ability to trade risk is low in a market that consists of a single financial product and where the majority of the outstanding securities are owned by banks and pension funds that hold those securities until they are repaid. In contrast, financialization is high in a market with a broad range of financial products and with the heavy involvement of short-term trading-orientated investors aiming to buy and sell frequently. More (less) financialized investors are likely to increase (decrease) the financialization of market structure and more financialized markets attract more financialized investors, but structure and actors can usefully be considered separately.
The importance of the ability of investors to trade risk (focused on ease of exit for international investors) has been highlighted previously (e.g., Maxfield, 1997, p.37), as has the distinction between 'patient' and 'impatient' capital (Cohen, 1996 p.284; Kahler, 1998 p.10; Sobel, 1999 p.22; Bryant 2003 p.43) . Maxfield (1998) considers the relative patience of different international investor types. This study develops
Maxfield's approach: first, by focusing on differences in the actual ownership of government bonds, demonstrating both the variety in ownership patterns and the role of domestic investors, even in international bonds. Second, the study highlights differences between investors of the same type, focusing on domestic commercial banks and individual investors. Third, a focus on the ability to trade risk, rather than solely on exit, highlights the importance of short selling.
Financialization is rarely used in IPE (although see Epstein, 2005a) . The financialization literature itself lacks an agreed definition. Ertürk et al. (2008) highlight four broad approaches (also Epstein 2005b, p.3; Krippner, 2005, p.181; French et al., 2008) . A wide range of topics are now discussed within this literature (see Engelen, 2008) , but the focus has been almost exclusively on the developed economies. Comparative studies outside Europe and North America are especially lacking. The ability to trade risk is a narrower definition, but one that encompasses the central processes of '[t]echnological change, regulatory change, and institutional change' (Rajan, 2005, p.331) 2 in financial markets in both developed and emerging market countries. Such changes all concern the increasing ability of financial market actors to take and trade risk (on the U.S., see Crotty 2008) . This article also highlights change amongst, and differences between, domestic banks. Aglietta and Breton (2001) recognise changes as banks add a 'new market portfolio' to their 'traditional credit portfolio ' (2001 p.441 ; see also Ertürk and Solari, 2007; Froud et al., 2007) .
Again, at the heart of such changes is the increasing ability to trade risk.
Case Study Countries
The article considers three case study countries: Brazil, Lebanon and Turkey. They are selected from those emerging market countries with government debt that is high enough to cause possible market debt constraints. A 'most different' selection approach is used. The countries are very different across a range of variables, including most importantly the independent variable in the study, the ability to trade risk in their government bond markets. A comparison of the countries is shown in Table 1 .
[Insert Table 1 Here]
Brazil ranks amongst the world's ten largest economies, has a relatively sophisticated financial system (Gleizer 1995, p.223; Carvalho and Garcia, 2006) , and was, in default and inflation that is seen as making them able to safely sustain only a low level of external debt (Reinhart et al., 2003) . Lebanon has suffered periods of high inflation. Aside from their position as potential emerging market bond investment destinations, these are three very different countries.
We would reasonably expect that the higher a country's credit rating and the more sophisticated its financial markets, the more a government would be able to borrow.
However, in the case study countries, the opposite is the case. Net public sector debtto-GDP from 1996-2006 in the three countries is set out in Figure 1 :
There is also a marked difference in the levels of government indebtedness that have resulted in a debt crisis. Most formal analyses of government debt crisis have defined crisis as default (e.g., Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009 (Santiso 2004 p.23) , which an IMF programme possibly pre-empted.
Turkey's peak, in the 2001 financial crisis, also necessitated an IMF programme and an exceptional 6.5 percent of GDP primary surplus, but only after far higher government debt levels were reached. The contrast with Lebanon is even more dramatic: 'For years now, Lebanon has been able to sustain a government debt-to-GDP ratio which is well beyond levels deemed sustainable' (IMF, 2006a p.28) .
This higher level of sustainable debt is closely linked to relatively low and stable bond yields. Figure 2 below shows the US dollar yields of the three case study countries'
EMBI components since 1998:
[Insert Figure 2 here]
The greater volatility of Brazilian bonds and the lower volatility of Lebanese bonds are clear, as is the extended periods of higher Brazilian and lower Lebanese yields.
The highest rated country, with the lowest level of government indebtedness and the most financialized markets, has seen both generally higher yields and the most dramatic spikes in borrowing costs.
Analysing Financialization
Financialization, as defined here, could be measured by the volumes of trading in government bonds, on the assumption that there will be more trading in markets where that trading is easier. The data certainly confirm the differences between the actually be a contributory factor to the frequency of currency crises in the 1990s' (Krugman 1997) , and before 2008 'many problems were hidden in the "plumbing" of the financial markets" (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009 p.221) , so a greater focus on this plumbing is needed.
Internationalization (increased foreign ownership of bond and equity markets or banks) also represents important change, but unless changes in domestic financial markets always result from the adoption of international practices, a focus on internationalization risks missing changes in domestic actors and markets. In Brazil, domestic private banks had a competitive advantage over foreign banks in treasury operations and technology (Stallings, 2006 p.245) , and both Brazil and Lebanon have seen recent periods of declining foreign ownership of banks. A lack of attention on domestic markets and financial market actors is a weakness in IPE's consideration of financial markets (Sobel, 1999 p.206) , and in the analysis of government debt generally (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009 ). Financialization, as defined here, considers internationalization, liberalization and other changes in financial systems, and considers domestic and international markets together.
This article considers first which investors own government bonds in the three countries. There are significant limitations in the available statistics, so quantitative data are supplemented by interview data. 6 The influences on the two central groups of investors, domestic commercial banks and individuals, are then analysed, focusing both on the investors themselves and the market structure in which they operate. A comparative event study then considers crucial periods of financial crisis, or potential crisis, to demonstrate how investor behaviour has influenced the outcome of such events. Last, the conclusion considers both the generalizability of the findings and the implications for government policy towards, and academic study of, financial markets. [Insert Tables 2 and 3 
Who Owns Government Bonds?

Domestic Banks and Individual Investors
Domestic banks, and to a lesser extent individual investors, are central to the ability of emerging market governments to borrow. The next section will consider the influences on these investors. Market structure will be discussed, but also the constraints on the ability to trade risk that result from the nature of investors. First, the ability to exit is considered, including both situations when exit is effectively impossible, and when constraints on exit (including exit via hedging) fall within the more conventional analysis of transaction costs. Shorting is considered next. The focus on the ability to trade risk highlights that it is not only the ability to exit, but also the ability to short, that are important to borrowing capacity. Shorting, selling securities one does not already own, is not exit, as the investor maintains an interest in the price of the security, but is also not the same as remaining invested. Finally, the question of investor capacity if considered, as investor behaviour is obviously only important if those investors have the capacity to influence markets. The question of capacity, however, is not only concerned with the size of investors, but with how their performance is measured. The way in which the investment behaviour of banks and individuals has been important in crisis and potential crisis situations is then examined by way of a comparative event study, examining the actions of domestic commercial banks and individual investors in the three countries at specific periods.
Market Structure
This analysis begins with the structure of the markets, and its influence on 'liquidity'. Lebanese pounds I will do everything I can, not only not to facilitate it but to make sure he doesn't do it with anybody else as well. I'm not in it for short term profit, I'm in it for going with the grain'.
14 Lebanese and Turkish banks gain little from facilitating such financialization, as it pushes down the price of the bonds they hold, and they cannot exploit it: 'it wasn't very interesting for us to create some more volatility on this market'. CDS increase financialization, in part by facilitating shorting.
The financialization of the market structure, important as it is, must also be combined with the financialization of investors. It is the financialization of domestic banks and individual investors that is considered next, focusing on the ability to exit.
Ability to Exit
The ability to exit is central to the analysis of a broad range of issues in political economy. In the study of financial markets, however, there is rarely any consideration of an absolute inability to exit, and even then only as the result of legislation. Here, however, in the specific case of the domestic banks, the analysis goes beyond the costs of exit, to consider the situation where 'full exit is impossible' (Hirschman 1970, p.100) . This unusual situation can lead to 'loyalty'. As will be shown below, this loyalty does not have to be 'enforced' by regulation (Cohen, 1998 p.132) , and varies across the three countries.
Banks' inability to exit can result from their large holdings of government securities, relative both to the size of the market and to their total assets, and from their inability to exit, short of closing completely, their domestic business generally. The size of bank holdings severely limits their ability to exit. In Turkey, the large banks cannot sell more than about US$300 million equivalent in a day, with one concluding they could not sell their portfolio in a year. 16 Similarly, Lebanese banks wanting to sell are faced with everyone also trying to sell, and maintain their holdings for fear of pushing down prices. 17 A US$20 million trade in Lebanese international bonds could move the market 1--2 percent in price. In a period of great uncertainty, such as after the assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri (see below), US$5 million would be sufficient. In the domestic bonds, LBP20 billion (US$13.3 million) is a large trade.
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This practical impossibility of exit goes beyond transaction costs. As far as larger banks are concerned, they cannot sell.
In addition, a high percentage of the banks' total assets are government bonds: in Brazil 27, in Turkey 51 and in Lebanon 54 percent. The majority of Lebanese interviewees believed a default by the government would lead to the collapse of the banking system. 'If the government defaults, we default'. 19 Even if banks decide to limit their risk on the government by buying fewer bonds, their exposure to the Lebanese banking system and the economy is effectively the same risk. 20 This is a risk the market structure means they cannot even partially hedge. Turkish interviewees disagreed on whether a government default would lead to the insolvency of their bank, but some consider that diversifying to private sector lending offers no protection. 21 The size of the banks' holdings, and their exposure to the bond market and the economy more generally, has a significant (but across the three countries varied) influence on their investment decisions. Specific examples of bank behaviour are discussed below, but the attitude of the Lebanese banks is particularly noteworthy:
'at least I have to keep…what I already have with the government...and if the government...needs some money, I have to give it'. 22 Brazilian banks own a smaller proportion of the market, and, as discussed above, the more financialized market structure gives more hedging and trading options. They still face the difficulty of their entire business being exposed to the economic cost of a government default, but the ability to exit is higher.
When the option to exit exists, the costs of exit have a significant impact. For emerging market investors, the costs of that exit are high. Transaction costs are particularly onerous for individuals but also for smaller institutions. Larger institutions, with greater sums to invest, can better meet these costs, many of which are fixed and substantial. 23 Banks in emerging market countries are relatively small, and the three case study countries show considerable variation (see table 1 above).
The result is a varied capacity to meet the costs of trading risks other than government bonds.
The range of alternative investments has an important influence on the costs of exit.
The narrower these alternatives (the lower the investor's ability to trade risk) and the lower their return, the more costly exit may prove. The international investors interviewed are generally taking views for a maximum of three to six months, with some even more short term. 27 In contrast, in the investment book: 'my 30 year bonds will never come back within the next 30 years'. 28 Banks, generally seen as buyers of short-term government securities, are buying bonds up to 30 years in maturity on a 'buy and hold' basis.
Ability to Short
Consideration solely of the ability to exit is insufficient in modern financial markets.
Many investors can now short. Both legislation and market structure will influence the ability to 'go short', but a major influence is also the investment mandates and decisions of investors. The focus here is on banks (individuals in the three countries had few possibilities to take short positions). 32 and could exploit the situation, for example by 'squeezing' the price of the shorted security higher. 33 This is a result of both the large holdings of government bonds by these banks and the market structure. The situation for banks in both countries is similar, despite only Lebanese banks facing a regulatory prohibition on shorting. Thanks largely to the BM&F, Brazilian banks can short, and proprietary traders at the larger Brazilian private banks, trading solely to make profits on their own books, will do so. 34 These proprietary trading desks act in a very similar way to hedge funds. In contrast, at a Turkish bank with a proprietary trading desk, the limits on trading are kept low, because traders might work against the interests of the larger bank portfolio of government bonds. 35 As one Turkish banker observed, 'I can't act like a hedge fund'. 36 Investor Capacity
Investors are only important if they have sufficient capacity to influence markets. This capacity is also important to Hirschman's conception of loyalty, because, to remain invested when market prices are in danger of falling, loyal investors must believe that their remaining will make a difference to prices; they must be 'quality makers' (Hirschman 1970, p.99) .
Capacity is partly a question of the amounts investors can invest, relative to the government's need for financing. Bank assets to GDP are far higher in Lebanon than Turkey, which is in turn higher than Brazil (see table 1 ). This, in itself, has a significant impact on government borrowing capacity. However, the willingness of investors to buy government bonds, especially in periods of market weakness, is also influenced by performance measurement or accounting issues, especially the ability to avoid marking to market. For individual investors, such performance measurement issues do not exist. They buy and hold government bonds as they would make a time deposit. They can therefore be significant buyers when other investors stay on the sidelines (see below), and not sell when others exit. For one bank, all the bonds in the investment account, 14 percent of the portfolio, had been purchased at such times. 38 The investment book is heavily used by government-owned banks in Brazil and Turkey, but even for domestic private banks, it represented 7.2 and 16.5 percent of securities holdings at the end of 2005 respectively. 39 For banks, financialization also includes the ability to borrow to finance assets, so removing constraints on risk-taking from the availability of customer deposits.
Financing comes mainly from inter-bank borrowing or through the repurchase ('repo') market. This short-term financing of longer-term assets results in a high vulnerability to market movements, the opposite of the situation with the investment book. In extreme situations, banks are similar to hedge funds. This vulnerability was exposed amongst the smaller Turkish banks in 2000 (Alper 2001 ).
Domestic Banks and Individual Investors in Crisis Situations
How Lula da Silva. All these time periods are covered in figure 2 above, and the striking weakness of Brazil in both relevant periods, and the lower yields at which Turkish, and particularly Lebanese, bonds peaked are immediately apparent. In each event, the range of possible outcomes, including an IMF programme or, in Lebanon's case, bilateral support, are similar. All three countries are vulnerable to shocks, both internal and external, leading to financial crisis, and such shocks should have a negative impact on bond market yields. However, it would be reasonable to expect that the higher-rated and less indebted a country, the less likely it would be to face crisis, and the more diverse the investor base in a market, the less severe that crisis would be. The experiences of the three countries question those assumptions. While the diverse nature of the 'triggers' for actual or potential crisis present some difficulties for comparison, contagion from the Russian default should be a concern for all three countries. Furthermore, the peaceful transition to a left-wing President in Brazil should have a lesser impact than the murder of Lebanon's most high profile politician and the resultant political crisis. Additional support is also provided by events not analysed in detail here, but discussed more briefly below. Second, the banks encouraged depositors to remain calm. 'Banks' managements were responsible for briefing branch managers so they could help avoid customer panic, which would have led to uncontrolled demand for dollars against Lebanese pounds.
This proved successful' (Standard & Poor's, 2006 above).
Turkey's 2001 Crisis
Turkey's 2001 financial crisis saw severe weakness in currency and bond markets (Akyüz and Boratav, 2005; Altunιşιk and Tür, 2005) . Turkish banks ordinarily lend government securities, but some stopped lending at this time, 49 
Conclusion
This study demonstrates how the increased financialization of financial market actors and government bond market structure can undermine debt sustainability and increase debt intolerance by increasing borrowing costs and the likelihood and severity of debt crises. This reduces governments' capacity to increase expenditure. This concluding section addresses two further questions, regarding the generalizability of these conclusions and their implications, both for government policy and for the focus of academic research.
Any conclusions do not directly apply to developed world government bond markets.
The 'safe haven' status of developed world government bonds increases demand at time of uncertainty and distinguishes developed from emerging markets. However, loyal investors may nevertheless increase borrowing capacity, for example in Japan.
For other middle-income emerging countries, questions of generalizability must first recognize the limitations of this study, covering only three countries over a limited period and employing a methodology that depends heavily on interview data. Further research is needed, including quantitative studies of a broader range of countries.
Nevertheless, some observations are appropriate. Schimmelpfennig and Gardner (2008, p.28) conclude that 'it is unlikely that many countries could, or even should try to, replicate the Lebanese experience', but the country nevertheless shows that 'building on special circumstances to cultivate a dedicated investor…base helps insulate to some degree financing flows from general market trends'. Broadly, this study agrees with these conclusions, but its comparative nature suggests greater generalizability. Lebanon is indeed unique, and it is difficult to envisage any country being able to follow its example fully. Such high government indebtedness also has potentially negative economic implications. Nevertheless, as the For academic research, the main conclusion regarding understanding the impact of financial globalization concerns the focus of enquiry. As important as processes of internationalization are to IPE's consideration of change in financial markets, domestic financial actors cannot be ignored, even when considering markets, such as foreign currency bonds, generally labeled 'international'. As important as regulation and liberalization are to the study of both domestic and international financial markets, a focus only on changing regulation is too narrow to analyze processes of change in financial markets. This is arguably more significant for those concerned by the consequences of such change than for those convinced by the virtues of everexpanding financial markets. In particular, while Maxfield's (1998) focus on different investor types expands the patient/impatient model of financial market actors, analysis needs to go further, to focus on the internal decision making of investors, the motivations for, and consequences of, these decisions, as well as the detailed structure of financial markets. 
